















































It is well known, that if a commodity is produced under increasing returs
to scale, so that mean costs are decreasin~ with the level of production,
then a supply functioll does not exist, sínce the profit function does
not attain a finite non zero maximum. So equality of supply and demand
cannot be a basis of equilibrium.
If a firm's mean costs are decreasing, then at a given price, either the
price is so low that production is not profitable at any level, or there
exists some level of sales such that profits are non-negative at this
level and profits increase with output. The profit is maximal if cutput
- sales is .infinite. Any firm knows that it will not be able to sell
that much, and it also knows that its competitors are in the same posi-
tlOIl.
Given total demand, it is important to eacYi firm, how consumers distri-
bute their demand among firms. We consider a homogeneous commodity, so
consumers do not prefer the product of one firm over the product of an-
other firm. Nevertheless each consumer has to decide from which produ-
cer he wil] buy. These decisions as a whole determine each producer's
share of the market. Consumers will always biiyy at the lowest price, so
only one price can exist on the market, since any producer asking a
higher price, will sell nothing. If some firm lowers the prevailing price,
his competitors have to follow him.
The distribution of market shares is a rationing scheme, as it a.lso
appears in the recent literatiirP on disequilibrium (see e.g. Dréze [3]).
There a rationing scheme is necessary to cope with excess supply (or
-demand) at disequilibrium prices. Typically in the case of increasing
returns there is always excess supply and therefore a rationing scheme
is always needed.
The first decision a producer has to make is if he wíll produce at al.l.
If he expects to sell so much and at such a price, that thi.s profit is
pcsii.ive, he will produce and be~ an active producer. If he can only get
a nc:gat.ive profit, he will not produce and be a sleeping producer.
Secondly he has to decide if he will accept the prevailing market price
or i2' he will fix a lower price.-~-
The market considered in this paper is essentially an n-persons non-zero
sum game. The equilibrium concept which is used is a Nash Equilibrium
wkrich is a non-coóperative solution: it is assumed that firms do not
consider the effect of their behaviour on their competitors (apart from
the assumption that they do expect their competitors to follow any
price decrease). This may only be plausible if the number od firms is
"large" (whatever that means). There certainly exist other equilibrium
concepts (coóperative solutions) which might be interesting in the pre-
sent case. However the Nash Equilibrium approach keeps the analysis
nearest to competitive behaviour of firms, in the case of decreasing
returns. However the market has also important features of monopolistic
competition since, given its share, each firm faces a decreasing demand
function.
In most theories, both of partial and of general equilibrium it is
assumed that mean costs are decreasing or first decreasing and then
increasing ("U-shaped" curves). Bain [1] considers the case of economics
to scale up to a certain, but possibly high level. in a recent paper
[darshak and Selten [~J introduce a general equilibrium model with non
decreasing returns to scale. Their approach is similar to the one in
the present paper, kiowever their equilibrium concept is different and
they consider a restricted case. MarLy other papers, e.g. Dierker,
Fourgesud and Neufeind [2] consider general equilibrium solutions in an
economy with increa.sing returns, which are enforced by some planning
mechanism; in these papers it is assumed that each commodity is produced
by onc fi e-m,
'Ph~~ present paper generalizes a result proved in [5J.
'ihe market.
We consider a market characterized by: (1) a non empty set Ir' -{1,2,...,
n} of ~otential firms.~ is the set of non empty subsets of N; (?) a
cost i~rnction fi(y) for each i E N; fi(y) - fi(y)~y denotes the mean
cost function; (3) a market demand fur.ction x(p), defined on the inter-
val 0~ p ~ d, where d is a(arbitrary high, but finite) maximum price;
(4) ~~ market share distribution p:~, ~ T U{(~}, associating to each- 3 -
set A E Í~ of active firms their market shares.
T-{pi~F.pi - 1 and Pi ~ 0} C Rn is the unit simplex in Rn and p(A) -
(P1lA),PL(A),...,Pn(A)), where pi(A) - 0 if i~ A.
Tk~e restriction of the demand function to a bounded interval rules out
complications with solutions, where prices become infinite (and produc-
tion infinitely small), which otherwise would burden the analysis.
The number d should be understood to be arbitrary large.
The market share distribution attributes to each firm its share of the
market, given the configuration of active firms that obtains. It descri-
bes the aggregate of the chcices of consumers among firms. It may result
from "weak" preferences of each consumer among firms, depending for
insta~rce on distance ("weak" in the sense that a consumer first consi-
ders prices and then chooses among the firms with lowest price). The
market.shar~: distribution might also be generated by random choices of
consumers: if all consiwrer choose at random, the (expected) value of
pi(A) wouid be 1~IAI,~A~ being the number of elements in A.
The profit function of the firm i
ni(Pi~P) - PiPx(P) - fi(Pi(x(P))
is a mapping of-market shares pi E[0,1] and prices p E]O,d] into the
reals.
A solution of the market, is a pair (A,p), where A E n is the set of
active firms and p E]U,d] is the market price.
Each active firm i E A produces and sells pi(A)x(p). Firms j E N~A are
sleeping.
Definition:
A solution (A,p) is feasible if for all i E A: rti(pi(A),p) ~ 0;
A solutior. (A,p) is internally stable if ít is feasible and if for all
i E A: p' ~ p~ ni(Pi(A)~P') ~ ni(Pi(A)~P)~
A solution (A,p) is externally stable if it is feasible and if for all
j E N`A: p' ~ p~ ~i}(Pj(A V{J})~P) ~ U:
An equilil~riiun is a soïution that is both internally and externally stable.-u-
So internal stability means that each active firm makes non-negative
profit and could not increase its profit by decreasing the price; external
stability means that no sleeping firm could make a positive profit by
becoming ar.tive and fixing a price not higher than the prevailing price
p. In an equilibrium no firm could improve by decreasing the price or
sleeping in (if he is active) or by becoming active (if he is sleeping).
This equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium: each firm's strategy is optimal,
given the strategies of the other firms, where each firm's strategy-set
consists of (i) being active or sleeping and (ii) the set of all prices
lower than p.
These concepts may be illustrated by figure 1: the curve depicts the






Pirst suppose that (A,p) is ari internally stable solution; i E A and
ui~A~ - pi: Then p E {p~,[ p2,p3] ,[ pD,ps] }([ pk~plt] ~ denoting the interval
pk ~ p ~ pR), for if p~ p5 (p3 ~ p ~ p~, p~ ~ p ~ p2) then a price de-
crease to p5 (p3,p~) is profitable for i.-5-
Secondly suppose (A,p) is externally stable and i~ A and pi - pi(A V{i}),
Then p ~ p,,; for if p~ pL, i could make a positive profit at some price
P~ ` P~ ~ P.
For pi E(U,1], the minimum price of i at share pi is defined:
r
inf{P~ni(pi,p) ' 0} if for some p E]O,d]:ni(pi,p)~ 0
pi(Pi) - J
l d otherwise
Note that. it is not excluded that ni(pi,p) - 0 for some p~ Pi(pi)'
(In de case of figure 1,
pi(pi) - p2; however
ni(pi'p1) - U)'
A feasible solution is externally stable if and only if for all j~ A:
pi(Pi(A V {j}) ? P.
For p. E[0,1] and p E]O,d], the restricted maximum price is defined: i
-~ min{P~ni(pi,P) - max ni(Pi,P~)} if p~ pi(Pi)
pi(Pi,P) P~ ~ P
p otherwise
i.e.,i's profit attains a maximum at p, given the restriction p ~ p; if
the maximum profit is non-positive, than p- p.
A feasible solution (A,p) is internally stable if and only if
pi(pi'p) -
P, ior all i E A, for then i is not tempted tc decrease the price.
3. Assumptions.
A. On the cost function: for all. i E N: (1) f.(0) - 0 and for y~ 0 i
fi(y) ~ U; (2) for y~ 0, fi is continuous; (3) for y~ 0, fi(y) is
increasing; (4) for y~ 0, fi(y) is decreasing; (5) there exists
c~ 0, such that for all i and y: f.(y) ~ c.
i
B. On the demand function: For 0 ~ p ~ d: (1) 0 ~ x(p) ~~ and x(d) ~ 0;
(2) x is continuous; ( 3) x is decreasing for 0 ~ p ~ d.
C. On the market share distribution: (1) p(A) - 0 if and only if A-~;
(2) if i E A C A~ and A~ A', then pi(A) ' pi(A')'- 6
D. Feasibility: for all i E N, there exists p E]O,d], such that px(p) -
fi(x(P)) ~ 0.
By assumption (A1) non-zero fixed costs are allowed.
However mean costs are decreasing by (A4), they are always larger than
the constant c. We do not make assumptions on the behaviour of marginal
costs. By (C1),p(A) E T, unless A-(d and by (C2) an active firm's share
strictly decreases, if new firms become active. Assumption (D) requires a
potential firm to be profitable, at least if he is a monopolist, (which
means that firms which do not meet this condition are not included in N).
There is at least one such firm, since N~~.
Lemma 3: Under assumptions A, B and C:
(a) ni(O,P) - ~;
(b) if p ~ c and
pi ~ 0: ~i(pi,p) ` D;
(c) ni is continuous in pi ~ 0 and p~ 0;
(d) if ni(pi,p) ~ 0, then ~rti is increasing in pi, for
Pi ~ pí'
(e) if pi(P1) ` d, then ni(pi,Pi(Pi)) - ~~;
(f) if pi ~ pi and pi(Pi) ` d, then pi(Pi) ` pi(Pi).
Proof: (a) follows from (A1); (b) from (B1) and (B5); (c) from
(A2) and (B2); (d) if Pi ' Pi ? Pi, by (Ab): fi(pix) ~ fi(pi,x),
hence (p-fi(pix))pix ~(p-fi(pix))pix ~ 0; (e) follows from the
continuity of ni; (f): by (e):
ni(pi'pi(pi)) - 0, hence by (d):
ni(Pi,P~(Pi)) ~ 0.
4. Equilibria in the casc of identical í'írms.
We first assume that all firms have identical cost functions and e ual
market shares, i..e. fi(x) - f(x) for all i E N, and pi(A) - 1~IAI, where
~AI denotes the number of firms in A.
If there exi-sts a feasible solution with m firms, there exist equilibria
for any set A, containing at most m firms. The equilibrium prices are
lower, the smaller the number of firms in A.-7
Theorem 4: If all firms have identical cost functions and equal market
shares, and if (Á,p) is feasible and IÁ~ - m, then there exist prices
pm ' Pm-1 '"-' P~, such that if IAI - k ~ m, (A,pk) is an eguilibrium.
Proof: Since (Á,p) is feasible and IAI - m, n(m,p) ~ 0 and by
lemma 3(d): n(k,p) ~ 0, for k ~ m. -
Choose:
pm -
~p if for all p ~ p: n(~,p) ~ 0 m
1
p(m) if for some p ~ p:,r(m,p) ~ 0
anà for k ~ m:
pk - p(m)
B lemma 3(e), n~ ~ 1
y (k'pk) - 0 and since k-1 ' k, by lemma 3(f):
pk- t~ pk ( for m~ k~ 1).
An,y solution (A,pk), where ~AI - k ~ m is feasible since
i
n(k,pk) - 0, internally stable since n(k,p) ~ 0, if p ~ pk and
externally stable, since n(k}1,pk) ~ n(k'Pk) - C'
By assumption D, there exists a. single-firm feasible solution, i.e, for
some p: n(l,p) ~ 0. Define p inf' {0 ~ p ~ ll max~rt(p,p) ~ 0}, so p is
P
the lower bound of the market shares at which a firm makes a nonnegative
profit at some price p, i.e. if ~~ p, then for some p, (A,p) is
feasible. If p- 0 feasible solutlyilons, and therefore, by theorem 1, eaui-
libria, exist for any set A C N. In this case there is a price p, such
that x(p) ~ 0 and f(y) ~ p for any y~ 0, which implies: px ~ f(x) for
all x, hence f(x) -~ 0 if x ~ 0. If p~ 0, the largest feasible solution
contains at most k firms, where k is a whcle number such that 1 ~ p ~ ~
~ k kt1'
The equilibrium prices pk - p(k), considered in the proof, give zero pro-
fits to all firms. For any p such that: (1) pk ~ p~ pktl' (2)
p ~ mín{pl2n(k,p)~8p ~ 0} and (3) n(k,p) ? 0, (Ak,p) is also an equili-- 8 -
brium, and by the definition of pk for k ~ m, among these equilibria
occur positive-profit equilibria.
Equality o2' shares and identity of cost functions is a strong condition.
The conclusion of the theorem which ensures the existence of an equilibrium
for any set of firms smaller than the "maximal feasible set" seems a strong
conclusion also. In the next section we consider some generalisatíons of
theorem 4,
5. Equilibria and stable solutions.
By assumption (D) there exist single-firm feasible solutions. This implies
that there exist at least one single-firm equilibrium:
Proposition 5.1.: There exists i E N and p~ 0, such that ({i},p) is an
equilibrium.
Proof: Let p- min {pi(1)Ii E N} - pi (1) and p-
min {Pj({lO~j}) I j E N`{io}}, Then any solution ({iC},P)
such that p ~ p ~ p and p ~ pi (1) is an equilibrium.
0
If (A,p) is a feasible solution, then obviously, if A' C A, (A',p)
is also feasible and by (C2) and lemma 3(f), there exists p' ~ p, such
that (A',p'1 is feasible. It is not true however, as in theorem 4, that
feasibility of some solution (A,p) implies the existence of some equi-
librium (A,p'). Neither does fasibility imply the existence of an inter-
nally stable solution. A feasíble solution (A,p) is internally stable if
no active firm could improve by a price decrease. It is possible, even
if for some i E A,~r.(p.(Á),p) - 0 for p ~ p, that some other active firm
i i
j E A has a restricted maximum price p.(p.(A),p) ~ p, Clearly in that 1 i
case j's cost fur.ction must be lower and~or his market share larger than
i's.
However if a feasible solution occurs at a price such that total consumer
expenses px(p) are lower at lower prices, then no active firm can improve
by decreasing the price:Theorem 5.2.: If (À,p) is feasible and p ~ p implies px(p) ~ px(p),
then ( Á,p) is internally stable.
Proof: (À,p) is f'easible, hence for all i E A: ni(pi(A)'p) ~ 0'
l.or p ~ p, we have: px(p) ~ px(p) and, since by (B3), x(p) ~ x(p),
for all. i: fi(pi(À)x(P)) ~ fi(Pi(Á)x(p).
Hence
ni(pi(A)'p) ~~i(pi(À),p),
hence (À,p) is internally stable.
Corrollory: If for some p~, d(pápp)) ~ 0 if c ~ p ~ p~, them any feasible
solution (A,p) is internally stable, for p ~ p~.
Particularly, if the total expence function has a single maximum at p,
any feasible solution ( A,p), for p ~ p, is internally stable. Let the
condition of the corrollory hold for some ( A,p), where I AI - m. Then
for any sequence A D Am-~ D Am-2 D... ~ A~, (~Ak~ - k ~ m), the solutions
(Ak,pk) are feasible and hence internally stable, for pk - max
pi(pi( k))'
~
and p' Pm-1 '"'' p~~ a result similar to the one of theorem ~.
A feasible solution (À,p) is externally stable if no sleeping firm could
make a positive profit at a price not above p. Even if p would be the
smallest feasible price of Á, í.e. p- m~.x {pi(pi(À))}, it is not impos-
sible that for some j~ À: nj(pj(À U{j})~p) ~ 0. Obviously then j's
cost function has to be lower and~or his market share larger than those
of the least efficient member of A. In the case of identical firms this
could not occur. This cannot occur either if all firms are similar, i.e.
if their cost functions and their market share are not too different.
Then feasibility implies existence of an externally stable solution.
Similarity of firms is made precise by condition a:
Condition a: There exists a function g, that fullfills assumptions A, B
and D and there exist numbers 0 ~~ ~ 1, 0 ~ e ~ 1 and 0 ~ u ~ 1, such
that
(1) for all i E N: g(Y) ` f.(Y) ` 1 g(~DY)~ i ~
(2) for all A C N and i E A: ~~ ~ pi(A) ~ Ti
(3) W ~ 1te 1 IHI IH
1-e 1tu- 10 -
Theorem 5.3.: Let condition a hold. If (Á,p) is feasible, ~A~ - m and
1
s~ y, then there exist prices pm ~ pm-~ ~... ~ pl, such that:
(1) (Á,pm) is externaïly stable;
(2) if ~A~ - k ~ m, then (Ak,pk) is externally stable.
Proof: (a1) implies, for all y~ 0 and i E N:
g(J') ' fi(Y) ~ g(WY)
~-.ince t; end fi are decreasing by (A4);
(al) and a(~) impl,y, for A C N, i E A and y~ 0:
g(1 -f~i Y) ~ fi(pi(A)Y) ~ 6(~( -j-~T) Y)
(a3) implies for k~ u and y~ 0:
g(~(k-E) Y) ' g(ktl Y)
since g is decreasing and cp ~
1}e 1 1te k
1-e ' 1tu ~ 1-e ' kt1 '
(i)
Since (Á,p) is feasible, for all i E Á: fi(pi(Á)x(p)) ~ p and
for i E A, IA~ - k ~ m, we have by (ii) and (iii):
fi(pi(A)x(P)) ~ g(ktl x(P)} ~ fi(pi(Á)x(P)) ~ p.
Choose
P - m
p if for tsll p~ p: g( (~~ X(P)i~ A
inf {plg (`~(1-e) x(p))~ p} if for some p ~ p:
m
g( (~-e) x(P)) ~ P
and for k ~ m:
pk - inf {P~g( (~E~ x(P)) ~ p}li Lhr ccntinuit ot' --~(~-E) x )) - 0 and since b Y Y E;~ gl k (Pk Y (A4)~
g(~(1-~) x(P )) ~ g(
( `~-~ e)
x(P )) - C~ P ~ P k-1 k k k k-1 k'
We have by (ii) and (iii), for i E A: and j E N`A:fi(pi(A)x(pk)) ~
g(~(~ke) x(Pk)) - Pk ~ g(ktl x(Pk)) ~ fj(pj(A V{j})x(Pk)).
By the left hand inequalities, (A,pk) is feasible and by the right
hand inequalities (A,pk) is externally stable.
Clearly a solution (A,pk) is also externally stable if pk ~ p~ Pktl'
for pk as defined in the proof.
Secondly we consider the case, where firms can be ordered by their
efficiency. Then a less efficient firm cannot block a solution of more
efficient firms, if the price is not too high.
Condition S: if i,j E A C N and i ~ j, then for all y~ 0:
fi(pi(A)Y) ~ fj(pj(A)Y)-
The firms in N are numbered according to their "market-efficiency" i.e.
mean costs of i at his share of total sales are smaller than those of j.
Conditior. B holds particulary if: (i) for all y~ 0: fi(y) ~ fj(y) and
(ii) if i,j E A: pi(A) ~ pj(A), i.e. low cost firms have high shares,
but condition R also covers cases where a systematically high market
share compensates higher costs at the same levels of production.
Theorem 5.4.: Let condition S hold. Define Ak - {1,2,...,k}, for k ~ n.
If (Am,p) is feasible, then there exist prices pm ~ Pm-1 ~"'~ p 1'
such that (Ak,pk) is externally stable.
Proof: By condition R ar.d the feasibility of (Am,p):
fk(pk(Am)x(P)) ~ fm(pm(Am)x(P)) ~ P~ for k ~ m- ~2 -
rrnd by (CÍ') and lemma 3(f), fp(Pk(Ak)x(p)) ~ p, for v ~ k ~ m.
Choose
p if for all p ~ p: fm(Pm(Am)x(p)) i P
pm -
P(Pm(Am)) if for some p ~ p: fm(Pm(Am)x(p) ~ p.




Hence any solution (Ak,pk) is feasible. By (C2) and lemma 3(f):
Pk-1 ~ pk'
For j~ k: pk - fk(Pk(Akx(Pk)) ~ fk(Pk(~ U{j})x(Pk))
~ f.(pk(Ak U{j})x(pk)), hence ( Ak,pk) is externally stable. - ~
Whether externally stable solutions are equilibria, depends on the
behaviour of the restricted maximum price.
Theorem 5.2 on the one hand and theorems 5.3 and 5.4 on the other hand
can be combined, to give sufficient conditions for the existence of an
equilil~i~ium, or of a sequence of equilibria. If eondition a or B hold
and if a feasible solution occurs at a price such that total expenses
are lower at lower prices, then the externally stable solutions consi-
dered in theorems 5.3 and 5.4 are equilibria.
E. Conclusion.
The most illuminating result seems to be the one of theorem 4, showing
that in the case of identical firms a sequence of equilibria exist
where equilibrium prices decrease with the number of active firms.
Simple examples show, that the difference between single firm equilibrium
prices and many firm equilibrium prices may be large. Theorems 5.~, 5.3
and 5.~ show that the conclusion of theorem 4 remains true in a possibly- 13 -
wide set of cases: existence of many firm feasible solutions at prices
where the price elasticity is smaller than 1 does not seem to be an
exceptional case; the main parts of the technology to produce most
products are public, hence cost funetions will not be very different,
so that conditior.s a and~or S may be fullfilled; where large differences
in market shares exist, usually the high share firm will not be less
efficient thfltn thc low shar~ firrri, and than B holds. Further generali-
:;atio~i~ ul' Llieorcm 1~ sc~em po:;:;ik~1e~.
It was a~sumed, that market-shares were i'ixed, depending only on the
composition of the set of active firms. A more realistic approach would
be to make these shares also dependent on selling expenses (advertisir.g
étc.) of firms. The model becomes far more complex in this case, It
seems however tkiat the structures of the model remains the same; in
[5] a result similar to the one of theorem !~ was found for identical
firms.
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